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Episode 147 Buy Episode

Fizz, Tax, and Legal Facts: Unpacking PepsiCo v Commissioner of Taxation

Law as stated: 13 February 2025 What is this? This episode was published and is accurate as at this date.
Paul McNab, Principal at McNab Tax Lawyers, joins David to discuss the landmark PepsiCo v Commissioner of Taxation case. Together, they explore the courts' analysis of royalty payments, the application of the Diverted Profits Tax provisions, and the case’s broader significance for businesses navigating cross-border transactions and tax compliance.
Substantive Law Substantive Law
13 February 2025
Paul McNab
McNab Tax Lawyers
1 hour = 1 CPD point
How does it work?
What area(s) of law does this episode consider?Tax; contracts; intellectual property; international transactions; trade.
Why is this topic relevant?The ongoing PepsiCo case has sparked significant interest this year, and for good reason. At its core, it’s a dispute about how Australia taxes certain payments between multinational corporations and their subsidiaries.

This case has already gone through the Full Federal Court, who decided in favour of PepsiCo in June of 2024, overturning the Federal Court’s earlier decision which had ruled in favour of the Commissioner. Now, with the most recent update in November that the High Court has granted the Commissioner special leave to appeal, there’s a chance we’ll see some further clarity – or a shake-up – in how these payments are regulated under Australia’s tax law.

For professionals advising multinational corporations, this case is a big deal. It brings into question how cross-border arrangements are structured and scrutinised, and it underscores the need to balance legal precision with commercial realities. Whether you’re in tax law, corporate advisory, or simply interested in global business, there’s a lot to unpack here.

What legislation is considered in this episode?Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (ITAA)
What cases are considered in this episode?PepsiCo, Inc. v Commissioner of Taxation [2024] FCAFC 86

  • In this case, PepsiCo and Stokely-Van Camp, both belonging to the PepsiCo Group, entered into Exclusive Bottling Agreements (EBAs) with Schweppes Australia Pty Ltd (Schweppes). The EBAs provided that PepsiCo and SVC (or a seller they nominated) agreed to sell concentrate to Schweppes for PepsiCo branded beverages, as well as the exclusive license to use PepsiCo’s trademarks and other intellectual property necessary to bottle, distribute and sell PepsiCo branded beverages in Australia (namely, the popular beverages Pepsi, Mountain Dew and Gatorade). Notably, the EBAs did not specify any separate royalty payments for the use of this intellectual property. Payments were then made by Schweppes to PepsiCo Bottling Singapore Pty Ltd (the Seller nominated by PepsiCo), who then passed those payments (minus a small margin) along to the Singapore-based producer of the concentrate, which was also another subsidiary of PepsiCo. The Commissioner of Taxation (Commissioner) argued that part of Schweppe’s payments should be classified as royalty payments for the use of PepsiCo’s trademarks and IP, and therefore should be subject to Royalty Withholding Tax (RWT) under the ITAA. Further, the Commissioner argued that if PepsiCo and SVC were not liable to pay RWT, then they should be subject to Diverted Profits Tax (DPT) under the ITAA, which applies to multinational corporations whose profits have been diverted offshore to avoid Australian tax, arguing that they had structured the EBAs for the principal purpose of avoiding tax.At first instance, the Federal Court held that part of the payments Schweppes made for the concentrate constituted royalties under the ITAA and as a result, PepsiCo and SVC were liable for RWT on a portion of the sales. The Court also found that, if RWT was not applicable, the arrangement was for the principal purpose of obtaining a tax benefit, and as such PepsiCo and SVC would have been liable for DPT. However on appeal, the Full Federal Court (FFC) overturned the decision. It unanimously ruled that the payments from Schweppes to the Seller were not subject to RWT. Additionally, a majority of the FFC held that if the payments were not royalties, the DPT would not apply. Most recently at the time of writing, in November 2024, the High Court granted the Commissioner special leave to appeal the FFC’s decision.

Oracle Corporation Australia Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (Stay Application) [2024] FCA 1262

  • Oracle Australia purchased software and hardware from Oracle Ireland under complex contractual arrangements, making sublicence fee payments for rights including the use of copyrighted programs. The key issue was whether these payments constituted ‘royalties’ under the Australia-Ireland double taxation agreement, which would trigger a withholding tax obligation. The Federal Court declined to stay proceedings, citing the need for a judicial determination on the definition of ‘royalty’ due to its implications for multiple taxpayers and international tax relations, particularly the dispute between the United States and Australian Treasury.
What are the main points?
  • PepsiCo may prompt distributors to review their distribution agreements to determine who bears the cost of withholding tax, potentially leading to a reevaluation of cost allocation between distributors and offshore sellers. This decision could pose practical challenges for anyone involved in cross-border trade, particularly in terms of passing on additional costs to the original seller.
  • International treaties exist to prevent companies from paying tax twice on profits through a network of withholding tax agreements between countries.
  • The concept of a royalty in tax is defined as a payment for the use of intellectual property. IP lawyers may not understand this concept as it is a tax concept rather than an IP law concept. Courts have determined that giving someone permission to do something restricted by IP law qualifies as a use of the relevant intellectual property.
  • Australia has General Anti-Avoidance provisions, found in Part IVA of the ITAA, allowing the Commissioner to set aside transactions done to avoid tax and reinstate the correct ones. This provision grants the commission significant power, including the DPT, with this being the first case involving the DPT rules in Australia.
  • The DPT targets the behaviour of large multinational corporations, imposing penalties and restrictions on access to dispute resolution processes. It includes a 40% penalty, a one-year waiting period before accessing courts or arbitrators, and an evidentiary sanction preventing the introduction of evidence not produced during the waiting period in court proceedings.
  • The system involves determining the answer under domestic law and then assessing if it is influenced by a treaty. Despite some variations in definitions, the consideration for trademark use remains crucial in both contexts, indicating similarities rather than major distinctions in this particular matter.
  • The Oracle decision acknowledges a broad range of international commentary beyond traditional sources, including new OECD directives on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting. International tax lawyers face the challenge of sifting through this growing body of commentary to determine its relevance to interpreting treaties like the US-Australia treaty, which may continue to evolve in meaning even after execution.
  • Australia is facing a tension between participating in an OECD process that influences international laws and asserting its own domestic position, which may lead to inconsistency. It is important to consider how this balance can significantly impact the interpretation and application of laws.
What are the practical takeaways?
  • Several important rulings involving the ATO, including the PepsiCo and Oracle decisions, have demonstrated the importance of bundling up commercial arrangements and viewing them as a whole to determine consideration. It is essential to gather all relevant documents and interpret them collectively to understand the totality of the agreements involved.
  • The Commissioner emphasises that these cases should provide guidance to many taxpayers, but small factual differences can greatly affect the outcome. This suggests that there may be limitations to the applicability of such guidance.
  • Parties are recognising the broader risks in agreements and are taking commercial steps to manage them, particularly in terms of recovery against the other party. This has led to a renewed focus on traditional risk management approaches and addressing issues around passing risk back and forth in contractual terms.
  • Consolidating all relevant documents, considering intellectual property, engaging in the process, and reflecting on pricing and terms can help assess tax risks and determine risk management strategies.
  • To progress your career development, it is important to consider the type of work and clients you have access to in your role to ensure you are working with a suitable level of complexity. Additionally, focus on topics that interest you in a multidisciplinary sense.
Show notesAustralian Taxation Office, Practical Compliance Guideline 2018/5 Diverted profits tax

DT = David Turner; PM = Paul McNab

00:00:00DT:Hello and welcome to Hearsay the Legal Podcast, a CPD podcast that allows Australian lawyers to earn their CPD points on the go and at a time that suits them. I’m your host, David Turner. Hearsay the Legal Podcast is proudly supported by Lext Australia. Lext’s mission is to improve user experiences in the law and legal services, and Hearsay the Legal Podcast is how we’re improving the experience of CPD.

Today on the show we’re talking about PepsiCo, Inc v the Commissioner of Taxation. Now, this PepsiCo case has been going on for a while and if you haven’t heard about it, well, it’s been sparking significant interest this year in the tax law community and for good reason. At its core, it’s a dispute about how Australia taxes payments between multinational corporations and their Australian subsidiaries.

Now, this case has already gone through the Full Federal Court, who decided in favour of PepsiCo in June 2024, overturning the Federal Court’s earlier decision, which had ruled in favour of the Commissioner. Now, with the most recent update in November, the High Court has granted the Commissioner special leave to appeal to the High Court.

So, there’s a chance that we’ll see some further clarity, or maybe even a shake up, in how these payments are regulated under Australia’s tax legislation. Now, for professionals advising multinational corporations, this case is a big deal. It brings into question how cross border arrangements are structured and scrutinised, and it underscores the need to balance legal precision with commercial reality.

If you’re in tax law, corporate advisory, or you’re just interested in global business practice, there’s a lot to unpack. Now to guide us through the intricacies of this case and its broader implications, we’re joined by the Principal of McNab Tax Lawyers, Paul McNab. With years of experience in navigating the complexities of cross border tax transactions, Paul’s here to share his insights on what this case could mean for multinational corporations and the lawyers who advise them.

Paul, thank you so much for joining us today on Hearsay.

00:01:58PM:A pleasure. Thank you, David.
00:01:59DT:I’m really interested to talk about this case. I always love a case study on one really meaningful development in the common law. But before we get onto the case at hand, tell me a little bit about how you came to specialise in this area.
00:02:11PM:Well, there’s two parts to it. The first is tax and the second is this weird overlay between tax and intellectual property law. Tax was largely accidental. It was an employment opportunity I had while at university, and I found tax interesting because it actually requires you to understand most of the fields of law and how they integrate in the tax system. So it’s an unusual and complex field of law. It requires quite a lot of experience with other areas. The thing that most fascinated me, though, was the concept of information as a commodity, and the value of intangibles – and for tax people, that is the bright line between countries. It’s a critical fault line as they divide up tax between countries. So the combination of those two things led me to be terribly interested in issues like this in tax.
00:02:57DT:It’s interesting, that experience of stumbling into tax, I suppose, at university and happening to really enjoy it. That resonates with me. I found that it was my experience with commercial practice. I don’t think I ever expected to be a restructuring lawyer or a corporate advisory lawyer or even any stripe of commercial lawyer, but I ended up there and was very pleased to, and it’s so interesting to me how common that story is on the show as well. We very occasionally hear about people who wanted to be the kind of lawyer they are since they were a teenager, but most of the time, what we end up doing and really enjoying is not the thing we thought we would end up doing.
00:03:36PM:No, I certainly ticked the box to be a forestry expert at the end of year 12, so I’m a long way off track.
00:03:41DT:Oh, there you go.
00:03:41PM:Yeah.
00:03:42DT:It’s a little off topic, but you’ve piqued my curiosity – what prompted the late in the day change from forestry to law?
00:03:48PM:My parents suggested that I’d make a terrible forester and that I should explore the law. So I blame my mother.
00:03:54DT:Having now had the benefit of some experience in legal practice, do you think you agree with them?
00:03:58PM:I think they probably had it right, yes.
00:04:01DT: All right. Well, let’s talk about PepsiCo. As I said at the top of the episode, this has been through both a hearing at first instance and a number of   appellate skirmishes. Let’s give our listeners who haven’t had the benefit of following the case since its commencement, a little bit of background.
00:04:18PM:Happy to do so. Can I also overlay just the context of where this fits into the world of tax?
00:04:23DT:Yes, absolutely.
00:04:24PM:That’s the second part of why this is an interesting case. So, just the facts:  Schweppes is an independent group that were bottlers in Australia. They’re not related to PepsiCo and that’s probably the first interesting fact for tax people.  Most of the tax disputes we deal with across-border are between a parent and subsidiary.  And here in the PepsiCo matter, we’ve actually got an arm’s length bottler – Schweppes – at the other end of the transaction. So that’s a bit unusual for tax. Essentially, Schweppes and the global PepsiCo group – and I’m going to gloss over which legal entity does which bit, just to try and convey the key facts – but the Pepsi group and Schweppes entered into a contract where Schweppes agreed to be a bottler and distributor of a number of key products – principally Gatorade and the Pepsi cola itself. The agreement between the parties allowed the PepsiCo group to nominate who Schweppes would buy concentrate off. So if you think about the bottling process – the concentrate is purchased, concentrate is formulated by the Pepsi group, and then that is shipped to the bottler in Australia who uses formulas to recreate the beverage in its bottling warehouse, creates the bottles, labels them, and then distributes them. So the Pepsi Group nominated a Singaporean company to be the beverage seller, and at the same time, the agreements allowed Schweppes to use the trademarks of the group in the process. And without that permission, Schweppes would have had trouble actually undertaking the process of bottling and selling.
00:05:58DT:Difficult to bottle Gatorade without putting Gatorade on the label.
00:06:02PM:Correct. So there had to be some ability to access the intellectual property rights and the trademark at least. So the critical facts then are: you’ve got Schweppes buying concentrate from Singapore and making payments to Singapore and at the same time having a right to use trademarks from other group members offshore. So there’s a split between who’s selling the concentrate and who’s allowing the use of the trademarks. The trademarks came in two different types. One type is they were allowed expressly to be used without payment of royalty and the other was a use with no express mention of royalty or otherwise. So there’s two slightly different fact patterns around the royalties. They’re the critical facts that drive the whole dispute. And what drives the dispute is the Commissioner of Taxes, “well, there should be some part of this price for concentrate that should be attributable to the use of trademark, and if it was, I’d be entitled to tax it as a royalty and levy a 5% withholding tax.”
00:07:00DT:The dispute is – just to recap, we have a contract between the concentrate supplier in Singapore and Schweppes to supply the ingredients, the concentrate. There is a royalty free license to use the trademarks. The Commissioner of Taxation is seeking to levy tax on, I guess, an implied royalty in the payments to the Singaporean entity, although the holder of the intellectual property is the PepsiCo group?
00:07:26PM:Yes, correct.
00:07:27DT:Okay. And you said there’s a broader context to this outside of the facts of this case. Tell us a little bit about that.
00:07:33PM:Yes. So for tax people, this is incredibly interesting. This is a use of intellectual property in conjunction with tangible goods. And two things come out of that. Firstly, almost every high value tangible good  has a use of trademark of some sort by the distributor. It’s not often you see models where distributors actually perform some transformation of the goods, as here they bottle, but you get a lot of distributors who import high value goods and then resell them in Australia and there is some use of the trademark.

So this decision has a potential application across a huge range of tangible goods companies. That’s the first observation.  Second observation, though, is that there are now a significant number of business models, especially in the hardware, software, IT services markets, where we’re not dealing with trademarks – although they may be there as well – but we were dealing with services or products that involve other intellectual properties, such as copyrights and patents. So what we see here. Yes, there’s an argument about whether or not part of the payment for goods is royalty, but there’s also an underlying argument about what is a royalty?  What use has to be made of intellectual property before it gives a rise to royalty? So the Commissioner has come out and said, for instance, that a major ruling on royalties in the software sector has been delayed pending the final judgment in PepsiCo.

00:08:59DT:Interesting.
00:08:59PM:So there’s quite a few other sectors that have flow on impacts from this.
00:09:03DT:Yeah. I mean, you can see very easily an analogous set of facts in consumer electronics.
00:09:09PM:Yes.
00:09:10DT:Which, your smartphone in your pocket is famously used as an example of the many kinds of intellectual property that it constitutes – the trademark on the back, the copyright in the source code, the design in the form factor of the device, the patent for all of the sensors it contains… I suppose there is a, depending on the outcome of this series of litigation in the PepsiCo case, there is an argument that importers of smartphones or who purchased the physical item may be in fact paying a royalty for that intellectual property.
00:09:42PM:I think that’s right. I think what PepsiCo will do is it will lead everybody who’s a distributor to go back and check their distribution agreements, especially. Because depending on how you price the agreement and the clauses you’ve got in it, if you have to pay withholding tax, there’s an argument about whose cost it is. Is it the distributor’s cost or is it the offshore seller’s cost? And if you’re a distributor acting for a distributor, you may need to go back and check whether that cost can be passed on to the original seller of goods. That’s the practical problem that immediately jumps out for anybody dealing with cross border trade out of this decision.
00:10:23DT:Before we depart from the facts of the case, for those who don’t practice in tax, we should quickly draw this out and make it clear. Royalties are treated differently for tax purposes than other payments because they attract an additional withholding tax.
00:10:37PM:Yes, a withholding tax. So there’s a rather complex network of international treaties between countries which try to make sure that companies don’t pay tax twice on a profit.  That’s the aim of it. And to do that, it breaks up international taxing rights to various sorts of activities. For instance, profits from a business typically are only taxed in the country where the company is formed. So a US company doing business here wouldn’t normally pay Australian tax on the profits, subject to a whole bunch of exceptions, unless it had a significant office here, in which case some of the profits in the significant office might be taxed here. But payments for interest, dividends and royalties; Australia is allowed to withhold some tax, a percentage tax, on the gross amount as it leaves Australia. And the expectation normally is that in the foreign country, there’d be a credit given for that Australian tax. It’s really interesting. I mean, we see this in the press as a dispute between Pepsi and the Commissioner of Tax, but of course it’s actually a dispute between the Australian Treasury and the US Treasury. This is like a battle of the Ents in Lord of the Rings. It’s a massive global problem between governments being fought at very slow speed, and the taxpayers are simply the meat in the sandwich on the day. So Pepsi’s got a US tax position, I’m sure, and it’s trying to manage that while complying with Australian tax law. But the result is these sorts of disputes.
00:12:04DT:Yes, that’s a good observation to make, that if the Commissioner of Taxation is correct, and this is taxable as a royalty, well then, PepsiCo gets the benefit of a credit in its home jurisdiction.
00:12:16PM:In theory, at least.
00:12:17DT:In theory. If it’s not correct, then it’s not entitled to that credit and pays, I’m sure, a roughly equivalent amount of tax on that income in its home jurisdiction. But here, the party that stands to benefit or forfeit a benefit is, as you say, the treasury of the two jurisdictions seeking to earn this tax revenue.
00:12:36PM:Yes. And there is a worst case scenario for someone like PepsiCo here, which is; Australia levies a withholding tax and the US disagrees and says, “no, that shouldn’t have been taxed, so therefore no credit.” So, it’s a problem when two countries don’t agree when a payment is a royalty. And we saw in April this year, a letter from the US Treasury to the Australian Treasury saying, “we think you guys are wrong. We don’t believe that you’re properly determining what is a royalty, especially in the software industries,” which is code for, “if you do this, we’re unlikely to allow credit on our side, which means that companies will effectively pay double tax, tax in both countries.” So, this is the problem for taxpayers, is getting the two countries to come to a common understanding.
00:13:21DT:Yeah, which you would think, given the network of treaties that you’ve described, should not be the sort of risk that multinationals are expecting to be exposed to.
00:13:30PM:Correct. They’re surprised, yes. Surprised and unhappy. So, we’re looking at this as a domestic law issue. We’re in the Federal Court. The Court’s debating what is royalty, whether the payments are royalty. There is, of course, a treaty over the top of that, and the treaty itself contains information about what is royalty, what’s not. And commentaries to the treaty are then brought into the interpretation, and those commentaries – the OECD commentaries – generally take a narrower view of what is royalty than Australia does. And this is the cause of discomfort with the  US Treasury, and there are now quite a number of cases and rulings in other countries, such as the Netherlands, where tax authorities have said, look, some of the fact patterns Australia wants to treat as a royalty, they don’t believe they are royalty. So you can see an emerging fault line in international tax around this topic.
00:14:20DT:It’s funny, I hadn’t appreciated this until we spoke, but this PepsiCo case, despite not involving the industry or the sector directly, can really be understood as another flashpoint in the tension between Australia’s domestic lawmaking and the US technology sector and their operations in Australia.
00:14:38PM:Absolutely. Yeah. It’s a proxy.
00:14:40DT:All right. Now, the Commissioner has argued for this expansive definition of what a royalty is under the ITAA 1936. Is this a new position for the Commissioner to take? Is this a novel argument or a novel conceptualisation of what a royalty is?
00:14:57PM:Not so much the question of what is a royalty, but more the question of when consideration should be attributed to it. So the concept of a royalty is defined in tax as a payment as consideration for the use of intellectual property of various sorts. And the key words there are the use of intellectual property. When you go to intellectual property lawyers and ask them, “what does it mean when I use intellectual property?” They’ll tell you they have no idea, it’s nonsense. Because it’s a tax concept, not an IP law concept. So what’s happened is that the courts have generally said, “if you give someone permission to do something which would otherwise be restrained by intellectual property law, then that is a use of the relevant IP.”
00:15:39DT:I suppose you could think about that in contractual drafting terms, as that list of things you would ordinarily be prohibited from doing under a license agreement – use, modify, distribute.
00:15:49PM:Yes, precisely. So what’s happening here  – there’s no doubt that we have a trademark and we’ve got permission to use it in a way that would otherwise be prohibited. So, in a sense, that concept of use of intellectual property is met – this case, though, is turning on the question of, was there consideration for that? Because of course, no money flowed for that permission. All the money’s flowing for goods up to the concentrate maker.
00:16:16DT:And at least in part, there is a contractual stipulation that in fact that license is granted royalty free.
00:16:23PM:Yes. Yes, exactly. And you sort of look at these cases, as I said earlier, people want to go back and check distribution agreements and arrangements after this decision to see how they apply. One of the things we’ll be looking for, of course, is those two examples, one expressly royalty free and one with no mention of royalty to see whether the court distinguishes between the two. In the Federal Court, there is some suggestion that it may be clearer if the agreement expressly was royalty free. So you can see there’s quite a number of interesting insights that we potentially get out of these judgments beyond the basic tax questions.
00:16:56DT:Interesting. I suppose there is a reason why the High Court has granted special leave.
00:17:00PM:Yes. That’s a fun question. Worth talking about. The High Court itself, Justice Kirby, I think started the process of giving insights into the matters that the High Court might take into account in deciding to grant leave. And for tax matters, tax for a long time thought that it didn’t really have much of an access to the High Court, but it’s now accepted that tax is of interest to the High Court, which is appropriate, I think, with respect. And if you look at this, there are a couple of factors that you would think should have led to a grant of leave. The first was that when you look at the courts below, you’ve got Justice Moshinksy at first instance for the Commissioner, you’ve got Justice Colvin on appeal for the Commissioner, and you’ve got Justices Perram and Jackman for the taxpayer.  So, although the taxpayer won 2-3 in the Full Federal Court, on balance in the federal court as a whole, it’s two all, which suggests there’s a difference of opinion that, appropriately, should be resolved on appeal – first point. Second point, the commissioner’s appeal documents clearly indicate that this is an issue that has wide application across a large number of taxpayers. So it’s precedential with wide application, which is another box ticked for the High Court, you would think. There’s a few factors here that suggest that the High Court should, and did in fact, take an interest in what is a case with a lot of wide application and based on some differences of opinion in the court below.
00:18:19DT:Now there’s a separate issue in the case independent of the withholding tax issue which is around the diverted profits tax provisions of the Income Tax Assessment Act in Part IVA, the Federal Court at first instance found that they were not applicable to the facts of the case. Tell us a bit about those provisions and why the Federal Court held as it did.
00:18:37PM:Yes, so Australia’s got a General Anti-Avoidance rule, it’s called, in Part IVA, and essentially that provision says that If you did something for the dominant purpose of avoiding tax, the Commission is entitled to set it aside and reinstate or put in place the transaction that should have occurred but for the tax plan. So it’s a pretty broad provision. It gives the Commission a considerable power and within it there are a couple of specialist avoidance provisions, including our diverted profits tax. And this is the first Australian case dealing with our DPT rules. So it’s quite interesting to tax people. Because it’s in Part IVA, some of the principles are things that we’ve looked at before because the concepts have existed in Part IVA, which has been there for a long time.

TIP: So what are the Diverted Profit Tax, or DPT provisions in the Income Tax Assessment Act? Well, these provisions ensure that significant global entities, or SGEs, pay taxes reflecting their economic activities in Australia. It’s supposed to prevent profit diversion to offshore arrangements, and it’s supposed to promote timely resolution of tax disputes by encouraging SGEs to provide comprehensive information to the ATO. The Diverted Profit Tax provisions apply to SGEs – defined as entities with a global income of a billion dollars Australian or more – either as Australian headquartered entities or local operations of foreign multinationals. Interestingly, if no global financial statements exist to base that one billion dollars of income on… Well, the Commissioner of Taxation can determine an entity’s SGE status based on reasonable belief. The DPT targets schemes designed to provide Australian tax benefits through arrangements with foreign associates, but exceptions include meeting the 25 million income threshold, sufficient foreign tax, or economic substance tests.

The Commissioner of Taxation applies an alternative postulate test in a DPT assessment – a bit like the general anti avoidance provisions – to determine the tax benefit gained from a particular arrangement. The test requires identifying a reasonable alternative postulate; a hypothetical arrangement that could have achieved substantially the same non tax results as the actual arrangement. This alternative has to align with the commercial and economic substance of the original arrangement, assuming that tax considerations were irrelevant. The use of the alternative postulate is meant to ensure that the arrangement is assessed on its commercial merits, focusing on whether it reflects genuine economic activity or constitutes tax avoidance. Similar to the UK’s relevant alternative provision test, the test examines whether under comparable commercial circumstances, an equivalent transaction might have occurred, potentially involving different parties or terms. If such a reasonable alternative would not have provided a tax benefit, then no DPT assessment applies. DPT assessments, once made, are subject to internal ATO review and some administrative guidance has been provided by the ATO that clarified DPT laws and their risk assessment frameworks  – and we’ll leave a link to that guidance material in the show notes. 

In the PepsiCo case, the Commissioner argued that under the alternative postulate test, if PepsiCo had not been motivated by tax considerations, they would’ve structured the payments differently by splitting them into distinct components. One part for the use of the trademarks and another for the use of the concentrate. This argument was meant to show that the actual payment structure, i.e. a single concentrate price, obscured what was an implicit royalty to use the trademarks, which could have triggered the DPT. However, the Full Federal Court rejected this, finding that the Commissioner’s alternative postulate did not reflect the commercial and economic substance of the actual arrangement.

The Court emphasised that the alternative postulates were inconsistent with the realities of the transaction, especially because the concentrate price could not be reasonably construed as including a separate royalty component. This inconsistency rendered the postulates unreasonable under the DPT framework, and as a result, the DPT didn’t apply. 

The DPT though is a provision designed to leverage the behaviour of multinationals. So the DPT part really only applies to large groups and it has a couple of particular provisions in it and the main ones that concern groups are; it says that the Commissioner is entitled when he applies the provision to assess you plus a 40% penalty, and to do two things. Firstly, make you wait for a year before you can access the courts, so it slows up your access to an arbitrator. And secondly, any evidence you don’t produce during the year can’t later be introduced in any subsequent court proceedings. So there’s an evidentiary sanction, a cash flow up front, and a delay in access to other dispute resolution processes.  So DPT is a pretty powerful provision for the Commissioner.

00:23:01DT:Yeah. And a set of tools that, well, I can see hypothetically how effective it would be in producing a result when policing multinationals. At the same time, quite a unique set of tools granted by the legislature, not one I’ve really seen in any other piece of legislation.
00:23:16PM:Not in Australia so much. There are precedents in a number of countries. The UK in particular inspired a number of our rules. So there are precedents for these types of provisions around the world. But again, they’re largely focused on US multinationals. So this is yet another of the strategic slow motion battles between treasuries to try and extract cash.

TIP: The Australian DPT provisions are modelled on the UK DPT provisions, but they exhibit important differences reflecting distinct tax systems. Both regimes address profit shifting by multinational enterprises, but have unique thresholds, applications, and interactions with their existing rules. The UK DPT provisions, introduced in 2015, have two limbs; the diverted profits charge, and the avoided permanent establishment charge. The latter parallels Australia’s multinational anti avoidance law, which commenced just a little bit later in 2016. The Australian DPT, which commenced in 2017, shares some conceptual similarities but incorporates a higher corporate tax rate and different tests, impacting its practical application. For instance, the UK’s effective tax mismatch outcome primarily affects tax haven transactions, while Australia’s higher tax rate creates broader challenges in proving sufficient foreign taxes are paid, even in jurisdictions that aren’t traditionally considered a tax haven, like the United States. Both DPTs interact with transfer pricing rules, but differ in their integration. The UK DPT allows recharacterisation of entire arrangements, analysing the consolidated arrangement rather than individual entities and transactions. Australia’s DPT operates independently, but lacks some clarity on its application alongside transfer pricing rules.  Also, while the UK DPT applies much more broadly to all transactions involving all corporate entities except for small to medium enterprises, Australia’s DPT only targets those significant global entities. Those are entities with a global income exceeding a billion dollars.

So just to go backwards to the precise rules of the DPT, though, essentially the Commissioner has an alternate postulate. He says, “if you weren’t motivated by tax, you would have actually done this instead.”

00:25:16DT:Yes. And this is a requirement. We spoke about the GAAR, the General Anti-Avoidance Rules on a recent episode of the show. This is a consideration or a process that you would apply generally in Part IVA.
00:25:27PM:Yes, yes, correct.
00:25:28DT:Including the DPT?
00:25:29PM:Yeah, so the concept is broadly in Part IVA. It’s not peculiar to the DPT.

TIP: So as I just mentioned, we actually discussed the General Anti-Avoidance Rules in Part IVA of the ITAA in another recent Hearsay episode with Sydney tax lawyer, Matthew Leighton-Daly. If you’re interested, that episode is number 137, it’s out right now, and it’s called ‘Getting Down to Brass Tax (see what we did there?): Understanding asset protection versus tax avoidance.’

It’s interesting, though, when you have a look at the decisions of the Federal Court in Pepsi, at first instance, the Court said, “look, it’s not necessary to explore the DPT as a ratio, because we found that there was a payment of an amount that was royalty. So there’s no need to invoke an avoidance rule.”

00:26:14DT:Because effectively, I suppose, even if there were a tax plan designed to avoid tax, it hasn’t succeeded.
00:26:22PM:Correct. But that’s the essence of it. The Court did go on to say, “by the way, if it had been necessary, we probably would have found there was a DPT scheme,” but it didn’t form part of the reasons as such. On appeal though, the Court held that the DPT did not apply. And the issue is certainly something that you would expect to be addressed in the High Court. Because the way I read the judgment of the majority, the proposition is that the Commissioner’s alternate postulate simply wasn’t reasonable on the evidence.  So the Commissioner says, “but for tax, you would have done this.” The Court says, “well, we can’t find that proved, and the taxpayer has satisfied us that there’s no other postulate that might’ve been applicable. So therefore Part IVA, or DPTs, have failed. It’s that sort of logic on appeal. And of course, what the Commissioner said in his alternate postulate, he said, “if you weren’t motivated by tax, you would have either split the payment for concentrate so that it was part concentrate, part royalty, or you would have paid a separate royalty to the other offshore entities that granted the use of the trademark for that right.” Where it gets really interesting – and if we might go backwards a little – I mentioned the OECD commentary is important when you’re trying to understand treaties, which is one of the other areas of law that overlaps into tax at this point, international law and the law of treaties. The question is, what do we make of the commentary in the treaties that, for instance, talks about trademarks on shirts? There’s an example given in the commentary that says, if a distributor buys a trademarked shirt which is more valuable than the non trademark shirts and sells it for a greater profit, should there be a royalty? And the answer is no, because it’s not that the distributor made use of the trademark in the  distributor’s own business. All the distributor did was enable the manufacturer to fully benefit from the manufacturer’s trademark.  So there’s a distinction around distributors who just “use,” in the narrow scope, necessary to do their business.
00:28:27DT:Returning to that somewhat artificial concept of using intellectual property.
00:28:31PM:Yes.
00:28:31DT:It’s the owner of the trademark who has used it in applying it to their goods, and selling it to the distributor.
00:28:37PM:Exactly. And the proposition is, that if it’s the case that the distributor is simply granted the very minimal rights necessary to fulfil the requirements of the distribution agreement,  then there can’t be said to be a use of royalty in the context of the treaty. That’s where the OECD commentary tends to go, and that’s how I think most practitioners and states have understood it. But here, we say that Schweppes has only used trademarks for that purpose, for the very limited purpose necessary, and certainly that’s the taxpayers proposition. The Commissioner says that that’s not an appropriate interpretation, there should still be an apportionment. So this is a significant issue potentially in the appeal.
00:29:18DT:How much does the determination of that issue turn on something that’s fairly factually specific to this case, which is the transformation of the inputs in Australia, in the sense that if Schweppes were distributing a ready made good, they were purchasing labelled, bottled Gatorade from the Singaporean entity and distributing it here, I mean that very much looks like your own logo-bearing T shirt example.
00:29:43PM:It might be a usefully chosen case to run, one would think, if you were trying to explore this issue. The fact pattern is perhaps more in the Commissioner’s favour than the fact pattern of the shirt importer. So, one might suspect it’s a carefully chosen precedent.
00:29:58DT:Yes. It runs that narrow line that you have to find in good appellate cases that make law, that doesn’t easily sit on either side of the conventional reading of the law.
00:30:08PM:No. There’s one more point on that, which is, earlier, I said the Commissioner had explained this at application to a vast number of other taxpayers, and this was an important reason why the appeal should be granted. We see the same strategy in the Oracle matter, which is a rather interesting – for tax people – an interesting piece of procedural law where Oracle sought to have domestic proceedings stayed so that it could pursue its international rights. And the court is currently considering on appeal whether it will give that stay.

TIP: Paul just mentioned the Oracle decision. That case centred on defining royalties under Australia’s double taxation agreements with implications for withholding tax. The issue in that case were sub-licence fees paid by Oracle Corporation Australia Pty Ltd, as you can tell from the name, an Australian subsidiary of Oracle, to Oracle Ireland for rights related to software distribution spanning from 2013 to 2018. The ATO deemed these payments to be royalties under the Australia Ireland double taxation agreement and issued a tax liability of 253 million dollars alongside some penalties for non compliance to Oracle. Oracle sought a stay of the Australian proceedings to allow resolution through the double taxation agreement mutual agreement procedure but the Federal Court led by Justice Perram denied the request for a stay. Justice Perham emphasised the public interest in achieving judicial clarity on the treatment of royalties, given there were 15 similar taxpayer cases and some tensions with the United States over Australia’s non alignment with OECD guidelines. While the mutual agreement procedures generally allowed taxpayers to pause domestic proceedings, broader public interest justified rejecting that stay.

 The Court also recognised the taxpayers preference for the mutual agreement procedure – that is, Oracle’s preference for that procedure – that Justice Perham prioritised a definitive judicial resolution to guide Australian tax practices and global disputes. As Paul mentioned, Justice Perham’s analysis in the Oracle case had regard to the relationship between domestic tax enforcement and international treaty obligations.

In his judgement, Justice Perham drew from international treaties like the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and treaty mechanisms – he considered the definition of royalties and its implications for domestic tax liabilities and compliance with international frameworks. The Australian Tax Office’s stance on royalties has drawn criticism from the United States for deviating from the OECD model commentary, and the Oracle case really underscores that tension between Australia’s sovereignty and unilateral interpretation of its obligations and its reliance on international consensus within the OECD. By deferring to OECD models while pursuing this unilateral interpretation of how they’re applied, we get this tension between Australia and its global neighbours and treaty partners, highlighting the delicate balance required in global tax cooperation and enforcement. 

In both cases, the commission has made much of the fact that these cases give guidance to a large number of taxpayers. But as you say, in the end, very small factual differences will have a significant impact. So I think there is a limit on the validity of that proposition.

00:33:02DT:I suppose what that suggests is that the decisions may have a wide ranging impact on taxpayers, but the scope of that impact will need to be further clarified by a range of other factual scenarios that differ in small ways from the cases that the court has considered.
00:33:21PM:Yes, you would think the Commissioner hopes that he’ll get enough out of them to use that as a starting point in negotiating with other taxpayers with different facts.
00:33:29DT:I want to go back to royalties for a minute, just because we were speaking about treaties a moment ago and the OECD treaties. The bilateral treaty between the United States and Australia – the double tax agreement between the United States and Australia – was considered at first instance, and the definition of royalties under that treaty was considered at first instance by Justice Moshinsky.  That is a slightly different definition of a royalty than our own Income Tax Assessment Act. Tell us a little bit about how that standard differs and why that treaty was considered.
00:33:59PM:So the way the system works is that you first determine the answer under domestic law, and then you ask the question, is that answer modified by a treaty? So you still have to go through the process of considering both in the relevant sense here. There’s not a huge amount of difference. There are some differences between the two definitions, but in this particular matter, I don’t think they’re hugely different. In both cases, there’s a consideration for the use of a trademark or the right to use a trademark is still a relevant piece of the definition in both cases. There are some other nuances, but they’re the main points.  Where it gets interesting though, is that the domestic law is unvarnished, whereas the treaty brings with it an enormous body of commentary and baggage. So there’s quite a body of Australian tax and, in fact, immigration cases that explain that in the treaty context, the Vienna Convention has operation. And all of the materials relating to the treaty’s execution are relevant to interpreting it.  So you’re not just looking at the words of the international agreement, you’re also looking at the OECD commentaries. And there’s now in the Oracle decision, most recently, at first instance, an acknowledgement that that extends beyond the traditional commentary that we all used to look at all the way through to new OECD directives, broader ones on BEPS and other topics. So you’ve now got this ever growing, enormous body of international commentary that you have to sift through and consider to determine whether it informs the particular question you’ve got on the US-Australia treaty. And there are complex rules about whether or not it’s relevant, depending on the point of execution, whether the meaning of the treaty continues to evolve after it’s executed. So it’s quite a jigsaw puzzle for international tax lawyers.
00:35:50DT:Yeah. One that it sounds like the jigsaw puzzle that doesn’t have any edge pieces and maybe it’s all one colour as well. It’s interesting to me that there are at once complex rules around the material that can be considered, but the breadth of material that might be captured within those rules is, as you say, incredibly expansive. I mean, it sounds like – leaving aside the situation in which a court or tribunal is making a determination about what material does or does not inform the interpretation of a treaty when you’re advising a client, for example, on interpretation of that document – practically speaking, it sounds like almost any context relevant to the treaty might barely be considered in interpreting it.
00:36:29PM:Yes. Yes, you have to, and you do have to consider it. Sometimes it’ll change the meaning significantly. If you think about it, what we see here is a tension between Australia ceding sovereignty into an OECD process, where a consensus of nations develops commentary and law, and then at the same time turning around domestically and asserting its own domestic position in a way that’s potentially inconsistent.  It’s the old tension between sovereignty and multinational bodies, which we see at this point in Australian tax now.
00:37:03DT:Now, this next question is a difficult one to answer because we’re yet to reach the end of this saga – but having acknowledged that – we’ve spoken a little bit in the course of our interview today about what commercial parties might now go away and do in light of the Full Federal Courts finding and the holding at first instance when it comes to how distribution agreements deal with liability for withholding tax and the description of licenses for intellectual property rights and royalties. Without giving tailored and specific legal advice – general legal information only, all the usual disclaimers – for companies doing business in Australia, either with multinationals or potentially multinational groups operating through their subsidiaries in Australia, what is a prudent course to take in light of holding at least so far as the law stands today, which is the Full Federal Courts vote?
00:37:53PM:Look, I think there are a number of things you can do already. And I think we can see this in rulings the Commissioner has issued – the Pepsi decision, the Oracle decision, and a couple of other cases that are roaming around at the moment – I think the most important thing to do, if you look at the way the Court in Pepsi bundled up the totality of the commercial arrangements into one place and tried to view them as a whole, which comes out of some stamp duty decisions, process of deciding what the consideration is actually for – requires you to get all the documents in one place and try and interpret them together.  So I think it’s not often the case that people in the past have done that as effectively as the Court seems to suggest should happen. So first exercise is customer contracts, intergroup agreements, the whole body of experience leading to the customer all the way through from offshore – to just stop and reflect on all of those agreements and identify Intellectual property, which is touched in the process, whether it’s impliedly used, expressly granted, used for consideration or not – the first process really is just find all the intellectual property. And the one that most concerns me in some of these cases sometimes is patents, which are often embedded in products as you go – trademarks and the like, designs, as you said earlier – so there’s a broad rush question to get the IP law team involved to try and understand what’s going on, the big picture. Then having done that, you’ve then got a contract law problem of figuring out, “okay, what consideration flows and does it in any way touch or relate to all of those intellectual property items?” It’s quite interesting when you have a look at the appeal judgment in Pepsi, the Court seems to imply that it’s missing evidence that would have helped it decide on apportionment. And it says – if I might paraphrase really badly – “we didn’t have any evidence that told us proper breakup of economic value of the components of the concentrate. So there was no evidence in front of us that let us say the economic value of that package of concentrate was actually a hundred dollars, but the price paid was 120, therefore the balance might’ve been a royalty or something else.” So there’s a bit of an exercise then in the second step of just saying, “okay, what’s the consideration that flows? How do I figure out what it all relates to and break it up somehow?” That’s a novel thought process for most people. You assume that you can rely on the face of the agreement. Pepsi says it’s not always, so it’s quite a useful exercise.
00:40:26DT:There’s a legal analysis of the pricing that sits underneath the commercial decision on the pricing, which maybe didn’t even enter the minds of the contracting parties at the time they entered into the contract.
00:40:39PM:Correct. I think that’s right. So I think having found all the paper, put it in one place, thought about the IP engaged in the process, and then gone back to reflect on the pricing and the consideration, I think you can figure out what your risk is from a tax point of view, which then helps you decide whether you need to manage the risk.  And that takes you back to the tax people, because if there should be a royalty or there could be argued to be a royalty, what does that look like? I mean, in Pepsi, the Court at first instance said that the right amount of a royalty for an incredibly valuable brand like that was about 5%. So Pepsi involved, I think, about 250 million of concentrate purchases, during the couple of years in question – I think  2018 or thereabouts. So 5% of that potentially was royalty levied on top of it. So these can be large amounts of cash in some cases. And as a tax team, there’s a question around, “okay, is it really royalty? Is it not? What do we do here? Do we redraft documents? Do we engage with the commissioner? What’s the best process to avoid a surprise and a double tax years down the track?”
00:41:40DT:Now, I know you probably don’t want to make a prediction on how the High Court is going to hold and maybe you do, I don’t know. But instead of asking you that, what I thought I’d ask you is this: We’ve said a few times that this case is going to have wide ranging implications for Australian businesses, for multinationals operating in Australia, and in other sectors not directly related to beverages. It’s one of several flashpoints, as we’ve said, in Australia’s domestic regulation and value capture, I suppose, in dealing with the US technology sector. If the High Court upholds the Full Federal Court’s decision in PepsiCo’s favour, what are the implications of that decision if the High Court overturns the full Federal Court’s decision and upholds the Federal Court’s decision at first instance? What are the implications of that decision? And I suppose the third part to this question – that’s getting rather long – is given that the case on appeal to the Full Federal Court was decided on a factual basis, that is, there is insufficient evidence for the postulate, there’s a relatively fact specific question around the transformation of the goods, as we’ve discussed, how much value can be attributed to concentrate and how much can be attributed to trademark… Does it even really matter which party succeeds in the High Court if it’s established that, hypothetically speaking, with the right actual scenario and sufficient evidence distribution agreements of this kind and be subject to withholding tax?
00:43:02PM:Look, I think the short answer to all three questions at once is that I don’t think the decision in PepsiCo will stop disputes of this sort, because I think the way the matter is unfolded, I suspect both parties feel that there are probably questions that they have a view on that haven’t been resolved. And that’s quite often the case with litigation. So I think if Pepsi succeeds, the Commissioner will no doubt be aggrieved that there was perhaps other evidence he should have sought or other avenues he should have pursued in the arguments. If the Commissioner loses, there are a significant number of parties who’ll say, “well, our facts are fundamentally different to PepsiCo and I’m critical, in respect, so it’s not a useful precedent for us.”  And I think in either case, the simple reality is, as I said earlier, it’s difficult to believe the Commissioner’s assertion that this case is so clearly precedential that it resolves so many disputes at once. I just don’t think that’s a logical conclusion. These matters are terribly factually specific and the process might help resolution of other disputes, but I don’t think it’s going to make it simple.
00:44:06DT:It may in fact have the opposite effect in the sense that being more aware of the potential for this kind of argument to arise. One of the takeaways for our listeners who may be advising Australian distributors of products that bear some intellectual property – as you said, there’s a separate stream of work now to identify whether or not those goods do involve some importation and use of intellectual property – it sounds like the takeaway is that we do need to consider distribution agreements and other contracts, which we might not have conceived of as contracts for the use of intellectual property as potentially being such, with a far wider conceptualisation of what it means to license intellectual property.
00:44:49PM:Look, I think that’s true. And there are some commercial steps that parties can take, because as I said at the beginning, for most distributors, this is a risk of recovery against the other party. So we’re becoming aware that there’s a more widespread risk in some of these agreements, but there have been positions to manage that risk over time around how it’s passed backwards and forwards in contractual terms. So I think it leads parties to go back and focus on those issues and adopt traditional approaches to managing it.
00:45:17DT:That’s a good point. That’s the real commercial takeaway, isn’t it? It’s not about predicting whether or not the liability arises. That’s a difficult thing to do. It’s about planning for who bears that liability, should it arise?
00:45:31PM:Yes, exactly. Yeah.
00:45:32DT:And I suppose there’s a few listeners who will now be thinking, “I had not thought we would need to plan for that liability, but now maybe we should.” We’re nearly out of time. Paul, before I let you go, I like to finish each episode with a question for our listeners who are earlier in their journey in the law, who may be law students or recent graduates.  Something that’s been interesting to me about our conversation today is – and you said this at the top of the episode in describing why you enjoy tax practice – is that it covers so many areas of the law. And in fact, other areas of the economy and the political system and there’s a real interdisciplinary both within the legal profession and outside of that nature to tax practice, especially international tax practice. For young legal professionals who are hearing this and think, “well, that sounds like the sort of field I’d like to be involved in.” At an early stage in their careers, how can they get more involved?
00:46:21PM:Look, I think there’s a couple of things to watch out for. The first is the sort of work that you’re doing. You want to be in a position or in a firm or a role that gives you access to a reasonable spread of clients with a suitable level of complexity. The second thing that I really strongly suggest is noticing the topics that you’re interested in generally, as you say, in a multidisciplinary sense. I mean, when you did law, what were the subjects that most interested you? And the question is, if you’re faintly interested in tax, what’s the overlap between tax and those subjects you found interesting and loved? Because part of developing a career in tax, and I imagine it’s the same in most legal fields, it’s about carving out a space for yourself, finding an area where you are expert because you enjoy it and you’re willing to spend the time to become deeply knowledgeable in it, and potentially ending up with a reputation personally that gives you access to clients and work. So it’s a bit of a process, but I think that overlap point is critical. You really do need to notice the other things you found interesting and don’t just silo yourself.
00:47:23DT:And on that topic, I suppose, if you’re interested in practicing tax law and you find yourself in a practice that doesn’t do that tax work, well, the inverse is true in the sense that you can be doing family law work, you can be doing commercial work, and in each case, consider the tax issues, extend yourself to think about what you might otherwise, and might in any event, instruct a specialist to advise on, but think about those issues as well. Well, Paul, it’s been a pleasure having you on the show. Thanks so much for joining us.
00:47:46PM:Thank you.
00:47:57DT:As always, you’ve been listening to Hearsay the Legal Podcast.  I’d like to thank my guest today, Paul McNab, for coming on the show. Now, as we mentioned earlier, we have a recent episode with Dr. Matthew Leighton-Daly about the General Anti-Avoidance Provisions, which are very closely related to this episode and its content. That one’s called ‘Getting Down to Brass Tax, Understanding Asset Protection vs. Tax Avoidance’, and that’s episode 137, also in this season.

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